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Abstract 
Previous research using the dot perspective task has produced evidence that humans may be 
equipped with a mechanism that spontaneously tracks others’ gaze direction and thereby 
acquires information about what they can see. Other findings, however, support the 
alternative hypothesis that a spatial cuing mechanism underpins the effect observed in the dot 
perspective task. In order to adjudicate between these hypotheses, we developed a double-
cuing version of Posner’s (1980) spatial cueing paradigm to be implemented in the dot 
perspective task, and conducted three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus onset 
asynchrony as well as secondary task demands. Crucially, the two conflicting hypotheses 
generate divergent patterns of predictions across these experimental conditions. Our results 
support the hypothesis of an automatic perspective-taking mechanism.  
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Public Significance Statement 
 
Recent research has revealed evidence that humans are equipped with a perspective-taking 
mechanism that spontaneously tracks others’ gaze direction and thereby acquires information 
about what others can see. This research has been controversial however, with critics arguing 
that the evidence in question can also be interpreted by appealing to general attentional 
mechanisms without postulating a perspective-taking mechanism. To adjudicate between 
these two competing theoretical positions, we conducted a series of experiments for which the 
two positions generate conflicting predictions. Our findings support the hypothesis of a 
perspective-taking mechanism that is distinct from general attentional mechanisms. This 
result implies that the general experimental paradigm used in this context can be used as a 
tool to investigate perspective-taking abilities – not only in neurotypical children and adults 
but also in individuals with disorders of social cognition such as autism and schizophrenia. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ability to track others' gaze direction and to infer what they can see (a process often 
referred to as level-1 visual perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981)) is an 
important component of human social cognition. It enables us to acquire information about 
others' mental states (e.g. what they want or intend), and thereby helps us to anticipate their 
actions, and to communicate and coordinate fluently with them. Previous research using the 
dot perspective task (Samson et al., 2010; Qureshi et al., 2010) has produced evidence that 
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humans are equipped with a mechanism that spontaneously performs level-1 visual 
perspective-taking. 
 In the dot perspective task, participants view an image of a room with an avatar 
standing in the middle and facing either leftward or rightward (this is varied from one trial to 
the next). On each trial, anywhere from 0-3 red dots are displayed on the walls of the room – 
sometimes all on one side, sometimes distributed between both sides. On half of the trials, the 
avatar can see all of the dots (e.g. she is facing to the left; three dots appear on the left wall 
but none appear on the right wall), so the perspectives of the participant and the avatar are 
consistent (Consistent trials). On the other half of the trials, the avatar can see some but not all 
of the dots (e.g. she is facing to the left; one dot appears on the left and one on the right), or 
none of the dots (i.e. all of the dots are on the wall behind her). On these trials, the 
perspectives of the participant and the avatar are inconsistent (Inconsistent trials). Participants 
have the task of calculating either how many dots the avatar can see (Other trials), or how 
many dots they themselves see (Self trials). A main finding is that participants perform worse 
on Inconsistent Self trials than on Consistent Self trials. The authors conclude that participants 
calculate the avatar’s perspective even on trials for which they need only calculate their own 
(namely, Self trials), and that computing the avatar’s perspective interferes with reporting 
their own (Samson et al., 2010).  This is an altercentric interference effect: another’s task-
irrelevant perspective impairs performance.  
 In a follow-up study using the same paradigm, Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson (2010) 
exposed participants to an additional cognitive load, and found that the interference from 
inconsistent perspectives increased. The authors interpret this as evidence that participants 
automatically calculated the avatar’s perspective (level-1 perspective taking) in parallel to the 
calculation of what they themselves could see. In contrast, the selection of a perspective to 
draw upon in forming a response is a controlled process requiring executive resources, and 
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was therefore impaired by the cognitive load manipulation. This pattern of results is 
suggestive of an automatic mechanism for level-1 visual perspective-taking.  
However, as Heyes and colleagues have pointed out (Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban et al., 
2014), it is possible that this task does not tap a mechanism for level 1 visual perspective-
taking but, rather, spatial cueing, with the avatars serving as cues to facilitate attentional 
processing either on the left or the right side. Indeed, this interpretation is supported by the 
findings of Santiesteban et al. (2014), who replicated Samson et al. (2010)’s effect using 
arrows instead of avatars.  
While Santiesteban and colleagues’ findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a 
spatial cueing mechanism underpins the effects observed in the dot perspective task, their 
results are not decisive. First, it is possible that participants’ prior experiences with arrows 
lead them to interpret the arrows as indicating an implied perspective (e.g. the perspective of 
an agent who places an arrow and/or the perspective of an agent who looks in the direction 
indicated by an arrow). Secondly, Santiesteban and colleagues’ results do not rule out the 
possibility that the version of the paradigm with arrows taps a different underlying mechanism 
that leads to a similar pattern of findings in the particular circumstances of these experiments. 
To rule this out, it would be important to specify experimental conditions in which the two 
hypothesized mechanisms should lead to dissimilar patterns of findings (and indeed that is 
what the present study accomplishes, as we explain below).  
There are at least two reasons why it is important to adjudicate between these two 
competing hypotheses. The first is that they lead to conflicting views of the relevance of the 
dot perspective task for disorders of social cognition such as autism. For example, if the task 
indeed taps a mechanism for automatically calculating others' perspectives, then one may 
expect autistic participants not to exhibit the altercentric interference effect, at least insofar as 
one is persuaded by evidence from previous research suggesting that autistic persons tend not 
to spontaneously engage in perspective-taking or other forms of mindreading, and must 
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instead mobilize conscious cognitive effort in order to do so (Schneider et al., 2013; Senju et 
al., 2009; Hamilton et al., 2009). And yet, interestingly, Schwarzkopf and colleagues (2014) 
did in fact observe the altercentric interference effect in autistic participants. Thus, if the 
perspective-taking hypothesis is correct, then this finding indicates a need to reconsider our 
understanding of perspective-taking in autistic persons. If, however, the task does not tap a 
perspective-taking mechanism, then Schwarzkopf and colleagues' results may not bear so 
directly on differences between autistic and non-autistic persons’ spontaneous perspective-
taking. Instead, Schwarzkopf and colleagues’ result may in this case be expected to generalize 
to spatial cueing paradigms. 
A second reason why it is important to adjudicate between these two competing 
hypotheses is that the dot perspective paradigm is increasingly being relied upon as a tool for 
investigating the nature and limitations of fast and efficient mindreading processes (Qureshi, 
Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Furlanetto et al., 2016; Schwarzkopf et al., 2014), and thus also as 
a means of testing theories of the cognitive architecture of mindreading (Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013; Christensen & Michael, 2015, Westra, 2016). If, however, the paradigm does not in fact 
tap a perspective-taking process, then it may be necessary to re-evaluate these uses of it. 
  To investigate whether the effects observed in the dot perspective task are due, at least 
in part, to spatial cueing, we adapted Maylor’s (1985)’s ‘double-cueing’ task (see also Posner 
& Cohen, 1984). In the basic spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980), participants are instructed to 
detect the appearance of a target either on the left or the right side of a screen. In the double-
cueing version of this task, the appearance of the target is preceded by two simultaneous 
peripheral cues, one on the left and one on the right. The main finding is that target detection 
on either side is facilitated: regardless of which side the target appears on, target detection is 
faster than in a baseline condition with no cue (Maylor, 1985, exp. 3; Posner & Cohen, 1984). 
The authors conclude that attention can be concurrently facilitated at two locations.  
 Building upon this result, we reasoned that if a spatial cueing mechanism underlies the 
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effect observed in the dot perspective task, then it should also be possible for two avatars 
facing in different directions (left and right) to cue attention to two different locations 
simultaneously, and thereby to facilitate attentional processing at both locations. Hence, on a 
version of the dot perspective task in which all test trials involve dots on both walls, 
participants should perform better on trials with two avatars (one facing in each direction) 
than on trials with just one avatar or with no avatar. This is because, if spatial cueing 
underlies the effect, the leftward and rightward orientations of two avatars should facilitate 
attentional processing at both locations (left and right), whereas the directional orientation of 
one avatar would only facilitate processing of objects at one location (left or right), and a 
room with no avatar would provide no facilitation. (This hypothesis does not generate a clear 
prediction about whether performance should be better on trials with 1 or 0 avatars. This is 
because, when there is 1 avatar, the discs on one side of the room are cued, but the discs on 
the other side are uncued, which may inhibit processing of the uncued side. If so, it is possible 
that these two influences may cancel each other out. It is therefore unclear what the net effect 
of these two influences may be.) 
In contrast, if the effect observed in the dot perspective task is driven by a mechanism 
for perspective-taking, then one should predict a different pattern of findings. On this account, 
the observed effect results from the interference of an inconsistent perspective rather than 
from facilitation of attentional processing. Thus, given that all trials involve dots on both 
walls, and assuming that the perspective-taking mechanism can compute two avatars’ 
perspectives, performance should be no better on trials in which there are two avatars (each 
with a perspective that is inconsistent with the perspective of the participant) than on trials 
with one avatar (with just one perspective that is inconsistent with that of the participant) or 
on trials with no avatar (i.e. no inconsistent perspective). (This hypothesis also predicts that 
performance should be worse on trials with 1 avatar than on trials with 0 avatars: even just 
one inconsistent perspective should interfere with performance.) 
Seeing	it	both	ways.	Forthcoming	in	JEP:HPP	
	 7	
 In order to test these conflicting predictions, we ran three separate experiments with 
different participants. In each experiment we asked the same question: When there are two 
avatars rather than just one in Self Inconsistent trials, is performance better or worse?  In 
Experiment 1, we created a situation most likely to reveal a cueing effect by including a delay 
of 800 ms after the avatar(s) appeared and before the discs appeared on the walls. The 
inclusion of such a stimulus onset asynchony (SOA) has been shown to be necessary in some 
gaze cueing paradigms (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Driver, 1999; Frischen et al., 2007; Xu, 
Tanaka, & Mineault, 2012), including a gaze cueing paradigm that used the stimulus material 
from the dot perspective task and in which the overall latencies were matched with the dot 
perspective task (Bukowski, Hietanen, & Samson, 2016). The inclusion of an SOA may 
therefore be necessary in order to observe the facilitative effect of a spatial cueing 
mechanism.  
However, the standard dot perspective task (i.e. as in Samson et al., 2010) does not 
include an SOA. Further, the inclusion of an SOA, as in Experiment 1, may mask the effects 
of a perspective-taking mechanism by providing participants with extra time to allocate their 
attention in accordance with the directional information extracted from the stimuli. Thus, if 
the results from Experiment 1 were to reveal that performance was better with two avatars 
than with one (as we would expect if a  spatial cueing mechanism were at work), this would 
indicate that the stimuli and the (number verification) task used in the dot perspective 
paradigm can indeed elicit a  spatial cueing mechanism, but it would not settle the question of 
whether a spatial cueing mechanism is responsible for the altercentric effect observed in the 
standard dot perspective task with no SOA. We therefore carried out Experiment 2, which 
differed from Experiment 1 only in that there was no SOA. We reasoned that if cueing is 
responsible for how the avatar affects performance in the standard dot perspective task, then 
since there is no SOA in that task, this cueing mechanism should also be activated in this 
version of our task with no SOA. In that case, we should observe better performance with two 
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avatars than with one. If, on the other hand, we were to observe worse performance with two 
avatars rather than one, this would be consistent with the hypothesis of a perspective-taking 
mechanism. 
Experiment 3 was designed to provide a more stringent test of the hypothesis of an 
automatic perspective-taking mechanism. We reasoned as follows. Suppose perspective 
taking really does occur when there is an SOA (as in Experiment 1) but its effects are masked 
because the SOA provides participants with extra time to allocate their attention.  In that case, 
it should be possible to unmask its effects by instructing participants to perform a secondary 
task designed to tax the executive and thereby to interfere with the operation of a spatial 
cueing mechanism.  That is, combining the SOA with a secondary task should mean that 
performance is worse with two avatars than one if the perspective-taking hypothesis is 
correct. Hence, the pattern of results from Experiment 3 should more closely resemble the 
pattern from Experiment 2 than the pattern from Experiment 1 (Tables 1a and 1b summarize 
the different patterns of predictions generated by the perspective-taking hypothesis and the 
spatial cueing hypothesis). 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
In determining the appropriate sample size, we used Samson et al. (2010) as our starting 
point. In Samson and colleagues’ study, each of the three experiments included a sample size 
of 16. Their Experiment 3 most closely resembles the design we used here, since (i) 
participants in that experiment (as in our design) were only ever asked to calculate how many 
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dots they themselves could see, and to ignore the distractor in the middle of the room; and (ii) 
since they varied the type of distractor in the middle of the room (a rectangle or an avatar). 
Based on the effect sizes observed by Samson and colleagues in their Experiment 3 (hp2 
=.186 and hp2=.285), we determined that for 80% statistical power and with an alpha level of 
.05, the appropriate sample size for our study would be twenty. We therefore recruited twenty 
participants (11 females; age range: 18-24, M = 20.75, SD = 1.71) from student organizations 
in the Budapest area, all of whom received gift vouchers for their participation. All were 
naïve to the purpose of the study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed 
informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the (EPKEB) United Ethical Review Board 
for Research in Psychology.  
 
Procedure 
'PsychoPy' software was used to control the stimulus presentation and data collection (Peirce, 
2007). As in Samson et al. (2010), the stimuli consisted of a picture showing a lateral view 
into a room with the left, back and right walls visible and with red dots displayed on one or 
two walls. Images of a human avatar were produced from the image files used by Samson et 
al. (2010), and were positioned in the center of the room. On one-third of all trials, there was 
one avatar facing either the left or the right wall. On one-third of all trials, there were two 
avatars, one facing left and one facing right. On one-third of all trials, there was no avatar 
present (See Figure 1).  
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 Figure 1: Examples of stimuli used in the three conditions (0, 1 or 2 avatars) 
 
 
Following the display of a fixation cross for 500 ms, a digit (0-4) appeared for 750 ms, which 
specified a target number of dots for the participant to verify. The image of the room then 
appeared with the dots on the walls and with 0, 1 or 2 avatars in the center, followed by an 
800 ms stimulus onset interval (SOA) before the dots appeared. This image remained until a 
response was given (or until 2000 ms passed). On matching trials ('yes' response), the digit 
specifying the target number corresponded to the number of dots on the walls. On 
mismatching trials ('no' response), the digit specified a number either one higher than or one 
lower than the number of dots on the walls (See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Trial structure. For this example, the correct response was 'yes'. 
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Female participants were presented with female avatars and male participants 
with male avatars. On all test trials, there was at least one dot on each wall, and never more 
than three on any wall, or more than four in total. As a result, the participant's
perspective was always inconsistent with that of the avatar(s): for every avatar that appeared, 
there was always at least one dot behind her/him and one in front of her/him.  
There were 48 matching ('yes' response) and 48 mismatching ('no' response) trials for 
each condition (0-avatars, 1-avatar, 2-avatars). On mismatching trials, the digit presented at 
the beginning of the trial sometimes corresponds to the number of discs visible from an 
avatar’s perspective (i.e. in the 1-avatar condition and in the 2-avatar condition), making such 
trials particularly difficult. Since the frequency of such trials differs among the three 
conditions, we followed Samson and colleagues in treating mismatching trials as fillers, and 
analyzed only matching trials. Thus, there were 144 test trials, 48 per condition. We also 
included 27 additional filler trials where there were dots on only one wall so that ‘1’ would 
sometimes be the correct response, and so that participants could not reliably anticipate 
whether there would be dots on both walls. These additional filler trials included an equal 
number of 0-avatar, 1-avatar and 2-avatar trials. The trials were divided into 3 blocks of 105 
trials (48 test trials and 57 filler trials) and were preceded by a block of 26 practice trials. The 
order of the trials within each block was pseudo-randomized and then fixed across 
participants so that there were no more than 3 consecutive trials of the same type.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
To control for speed-accuracy tradeoffs, reaction time (RT) for correct responses and hit rates 
(HR) were also merged into inverse efficiency scores (IES), a combined measure which 
homogenizes different patterns of speed-accuracy trade-offs within a group (IES=RT/HR; 
Townsend & Ashby, 1978). Since the calculation of IES entails that RTs are quasi-
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exponentially multiplied as the HR decreases, Bruyer & Brysbaert (2011) have recommend 
not using the IES unless the mean HR within a group is above 90%. In our sample, the mean 
HR was above 90% in all three conditions, indicating that it was appropriate to use IES for the 
primary analysis. Further below, we also include analyses of the RTs and HRs. 
In calculating mean reaction times (RTs), response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.31% of the data) and erroneous responses (3.94% of the data) were eliminated 
from the data set. We also removed trials with responses that were more than 2.5 SDs greater 
or less than the mean for each participant for each condition (2.83% of the data). 
 
Inverse Efficiency Score Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for IES, which revealed a significant main effect of 
number of avatars, with performance being better in the 2-avatar condition (M = 661.65, SD = 
128.38) than in the 0-avatar condition (M= 678.05, SD= 130.91), and the 1-avatar condition 
(M= 681.20 SD= 134.75) (F(2,18) = 5.30, p = .009, hp2 = 0.218). This is consistent with the 
operation of a spatial cueing mechanism. Planned contrast analyses revealed a significant 
difference between the 2-avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition, with performance being 
significantly better in the former than in the latter (t (19) = 3.51, p = .002, d = 0.149), and also 
between the 2-avatar condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being 
significantly better in the former than in the latter (t (19) = 2.63, p = .016, d = 0.127). Both of 
those results are consistent with the hypothesis of a spatial cueing mechanism and not with 
the hypothesis of a perspective-taking mechanism. There was no significant difference 
between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar conditions (t (19) = 0.424, p = .676, d= 0.024) (See 
Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Seeing	it	both	ways	
	 13	
Reaction Time Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for reaction times (RTs), which revealed a significant 
main effect of number of avatars, with performance being better in the 2-avatar condition (M 
= 634.35, SD = 117.26) than in the 0-avatar condition (M= 652.11, SD= 122.94), and the 1-
avatar condition (649.20 SD= 130.42), (F(2,18) = 5.86, p = .006, hp2 = 0.236). This is 
consistent with the operation of a spatial cueing mechanism (See Figure 4). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed a significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being significantly better in the 
former than in the latter (t (19) = 3.10, p = .006, d = 0.148), and also between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 1-avatar condition, with performance being significantly better in the 
former than in the latter (t (19) = 2.49, p = .022, d = 0.127). Both of those results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of a spatial cueing mechanism and not with the hypothesis that 
a perspective-taking mechanism underlies the effects of avatars on performance in this task. 
There was no significant difference between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar conditions (t (19) = 
0.588, p = .56, d= 0.024).  
 
Accuracy Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for hit rates (HRs), which revealed no significant 
differences among the in the 2-avatar condition (M = 96.11%, SD = 3.44%), the 0-avatar 
condition (M= 96.28, SD= 2.33), and the 1-avatar condition (95.37% SD= 4.28%), (F(2,18) = 
1.33, p = .275, hp2 = 0.236), (See Figure 5). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed no significant differences among the conditions: 
neither between the 2-avatar condition and the 0-avatar condition, (t(19) = .377, p = .71, d = 
0.058), nor between the 2-avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition (t(19) = 1.3, p = .211, d 
= 0.19), nor between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar condition (t(19) = .126, p = .224, d= 
0.263).  
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Figure 3: Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES). Error bars represent the within-subject confidence 
intervals (following the method proposed by Cousineau, 2005; cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Symbols indicate significance level (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ns= non-significant).  
 
Figure 4: Reaction Times. Error bars represent the within-subject confidence intervals 
(following the method proposed by Cousineau, 2005; cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994). Symbols 
indicate significance level (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ns= non-significant). 
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Figure 5: Hit Rates. Error bars represent the within-subject confidence intervals (following 
the method proposed by Cousineau, 2005; cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994). Symbols indicate 
significance level (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ns= non-significant). 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that the stimuli and the number verification procedure 
used in the dot perspective task can be used to trigger a spatial cueing mechanism, and that 
attention can be facilitated at two locations with avatars oriented in opposite directions.  This 
is consistent with the operation of a spatial cueing mechanism. However, it would not be 
justified to conclude that the standard dot perspective task taps a spatial cueing mechanism 
and not a perspective-taking mechanism. This is because Experiment 1, like gaze cueing 
paradigms but unlike the standard dot perspective task, included an SOA. We do not know 
what effect an SOA may have on how perspective taking processes influence judgments. In 
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order to support the view that a spatial cueing mechanism underlines performance on the 
standard dot perspective task, it would be necessary to observe the same pattern of findings 
with no SOA. The aim of Experiment 2 was to do just this. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Twenty participants (12 females; age range: 20-31, M = 25.67, SD = 3.16.) were 
recruited from student organizations in the Budapest area, and received gift vouchers for their 
participation. A statistical power analysis for a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with 
three levels using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) confirmed that, based upon the effect size 
(hp2 = 0.218) observed in experiment 1 (and for 80% statistical power and an alpha level of 
.05), twenty was the appropriate sample size for experiment 2. For the analyses, we excluded 
the data from two participants: one of these had an IES more than 3 SD greater than the mean 
for the group, and the other failed to complete the task. All were naïve to the purpose of the 
study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed informed consent prior to the 
experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
and was approved by the (EPKEB) United Ethical Review Board for Research in Psychology. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with one exception: when the image of the 
room with 0,1 or 2 avatars appeared, the dots on the walls appeared simultaneously, i.e. there 
was no SOA. The image remained until a response was given (or until 2000 ms passed), as in 
Experiment 1.  
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Results and Discussion 
As for Experiment 1, in calculating mean reaction times (RTs), response omissions due to the 
timeout procedure (0.17 % of the data) and erroneous responses (3.86% of the data) were 
eliminated from the data set. We also removed trials with responses that were more than 2.5 
SDs greater or less than the mean for each participant for each condition (2.78% of the data). 
 
Inverse Efficiency Score Analysis 
We then performed a three-way ANOVA for IES, which revealed a significant main effect of 
number of avatars, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition (M = 607.87, SD = 
120.80) than in the 1-avatar condition (M= 592.87, SD = 122.85) or the 0-avatar condition 
(M= 581.02, SD = 111.49), (F(2,16) = 4.47, p = .019, hp2 = 0.208) (See Figure 3). A planned 
contrast analysis revealed a significant difference between the 2-avatar condition and the 0-
avatar condition, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition than in the 0-avatar 
condition (t (17) = 4.79, p < .001, d = 0.23). These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
of a perspective-taking mechanism and difficult to account for by appealing to the operation 
of a spatial cueing mechanism. There was no significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 1-avatar condition (t (17) = 1.27, p = .221, d = 0.123), nor between the 1-
avatar and the 0-avatar conditions (t (17) = 1.639, p = .118, d = 0.1) (See Figure 3). 
 
Reaction Time Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for RT, which revealed no significant difference among 
the 2-avatar condition (M=582.00, SD=116.66), the 1-avatar condition (572.23 SD=114.45) 
and the 0-avatar condition (M=568.14, SD=113.15) (F(2,16) = 2.41, p = .104, hp2 = 0.124) 
(See Figure 4). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed a significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition 
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than in the 0-avatar condition (t(17) = 2.90, p = .01, d = 0.23). This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis of a perspective taking mechanism and not with the hypothesis that a spatial 
cueing mechanism underlies the effects of avatars on performance in this task. The difference 
between the 2-avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition did not reach significance (t (17) = 
1.26, p = .23, d = 0.093); nor did the difference between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar 
conditions (t(17) = 0.60, p = .56, d= 0.04).  
 
Accuracy Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for hit rates (HRs), which revealed no significant 
differences among the 2-avatar condition (M = 95.94%, SD = 2.65%), the 0-avatar condition 
(M= 97.76%, SD= 2.84%), and the 1-avatar condition (96.68% SD= 2.95%), (F(2,16) = 2.24, 
p = .112, hp2 = 0.236) (See Figure 5).  
Planned contrast analyses revealed a significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition 
than in the 0-avatar condition (t (17) = 3.04, p = .007, d = 0.663). This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis of a perspective taking mechanism and not with the hypothesis that a spatial 
cueing mechanism underlies the effects of avatars on performance in this task. The difference 
between the 2-avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition did not reach significance (t(17) = 
0.78, p = .446, d = 0.262); nor did the difference between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar 
conditions (t(17) = 1.08, p = .29, d= 0.375).  
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Experiment 3 
 
In Experiment 2, the pattern of results we found in Experiment 1 is reversed. The reversal 
indicates that a perspective-taking mechanism, rather than a spatial cueing mechanism, may 
underpin performance on standard dot perspective tasks. However, to be at all confident in 
this interpretation we must further investigate the effects of the SOA.  Taken at face value, the 
results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that there may be two separate mechanisms at work, 
with the perspective-taking mechanism predominating at earlier time points and the spatial 
cueing mechanism predominating at later time points. If so, it may be possible to selectively 
intervene on the spatial cueing mechanism and prolong the effects of the perspective-taking 
mechanism. 
To test whether this is indeed possible, we re-introduced the 800ms SOA in 
Experiment 3, but also instructed participants to concurrently perform a secondary task. We 
reasoned that the secondary task may interfere with the spatial cueing mechanism, since there 
is evidence that attention shifts in response to central cues can be inhibited through the use of 
concurrent secondary tasks to increase processing demands (Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 
1989; Frischen et al., 2007). In light of Qureshi, Apperly & Samson (2010)’s finding that the 
perspective-taking mechanism was not inhibited by the concurrent performance of a 
secondary task, we predicted that it would predominate in this version of the task, and that we 
would therefore again observe better performance with 1 avatar than with 2. For the 
secondary task, we chose an auditory-tone-monitoring task, and recorded verbal responses in 
order to rule out any visuospatial or motor interference with the dot perspective task.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seeing	it	both	ways	
	 20	
A statistical power analysis for a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with three levels using 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) confirmed that, based upon the effect size (hp2 = 0.218) 
observed in experiment 1 (and for 80% statistical power and an alpha level of .05), twenty 
was the appropriate sample size for experiment 2. Twenty participants (10 females; age range: 
21-30, M= 24.77, SD = 2.63.) were therefore recruited from student organizations in the 
Budapest area, and received gift vouchers for their participation.  
All were naïve to the purpose of the study, reported normal or corrected to normal 
vision, and signed informed consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the (EPKEB) United 
Ethical Review Board for Research in Psychology. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for the dot perspective task was the same as in Experiment 1. In addition, 
however, participants performed an additional practice block of trials for the auditory-tone-
monitoring task, and in all non-practice trials they concurrently performed the auditory-tone-
monitoring task. For the auditory task, two tones were presented over a pair of headphones 
during the 800 ms. The first tone was presented 100ms after the image of the room appeared, 
and the second tone was presented 150 ms later, i.e. 250 ms after the appearance of the image 
of the room with the avatar(s). On half of the trials, the tones were presented at the same 
pitch. On the other half of the trials, one of the tones was presented at a high pitch and the 
other at a low pitch. Participants were instructed to give a verbal response (by saying ‘Same!’ 
into a microphone) if the two tones were the same, and otherwise to give no response. They 
were instructed to make their responses (if at all) as quickly as possible, and in any case 
before the discs on the wall appeared. Participants first performed one practice block of the 
dot perspective task, as in Experiments 1 and 2. Then they performed one practice block of 
the auditory-tone-monitoring task alone, without the dot perspective task. Next, they 
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performed a practice block of the dot perspective task in conjunction with the auditory-tone-
monitoring task. After these three practice blocks, they proceeded to the test blocks. 
  
Results and Discussion 
As for Experiments 1 and 2, in calculating mean reaction times (RTs), response omissions due 
to the timeout procedure (1.12 % of the data) and erroneous responses (7.05% of the data) 
were eliminated from the data set. We also removed trials with responses that were more than 
2.5 SDs greater or less than the mean for each participant for each condition (3.18 % of the 
data). 
 
Inverse Efficiency Score Analysis 
We then performed a three-way ANOVA for IES, which revealed a significant main effect of 
number of avatars, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition (M = 773.56, SD = 
261.83) than in the 1-avatar condition (717.37 SD= 188.80) or the 0-avatar condition (M= 
714.20, SD = 190.60), (F(2,18) = 4.71, p = .015, hp2 = 0.199) (See Figure 3).  A planned 
contrast analysis of performance in the 2-avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition revealed 
a marginally significant difference, with performance in the 2-avatar condition being worse 
than in the 1-avatar condition (t(19) = 2.08, p = .051, d = 0.246). A planned contrast of 
performance in the 2-avatar condition and the 0-avatar condition revealed a significant 
difference between the 2-avatar condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being 
worse in the 2-avatar condition than in the 0-avatar condition (t(19) = 2.89, p = .009, d = 
0.259). There was no significant difference between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar conditions 
(t(19) = 0.194, p = .849, d = 0.017) (See Figure 3). 
 On the auditory-tone-monitoring task, the overall hit rate for the group was 78.49%. 
Mean reaction time, (from the initiation of the second tone) was 354.83 ms (SD=210.91). We 
decided not to exclude any participants on the basis of their performance on the secondary 
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task, since it is not possible to infer how distracting a participant found this task from 
performance (some will have found the task more difficult than others), and the purpose of 
this task was to distract participants from the dot perspective task. 
 
Reaction Time Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for reaction times (RTs), which revealed no significant 
difference among the 2-avatar condition (M = 655.51, SD =160.30), the 0-avatar condition 
(M= 646.13, SD= 153.39), and the 1-avatar condition (M= 648.11 SD= 144.46), (F(2,18) = 
0.66, p = .525, hp2 = 0.033) (See Figure 4). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed no significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 0-avatar condition (t (19) = 3.10, p = .006, d = 0.148), nor between the 2-
avatar condition and the 1-avatar condition (t (19) = 2.49, p = .022, d = 0.127), nor between 
the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar conditions (t (19) = 0.588, p = .56, d= 0.024).  
 
Accuracy Analysis 
We performed a three-way ANOVA for hit rates (HRs), which revealed a significant main 
effect of number of avatar, with performance being worse in the 2-avatar condition (M = 
87.10%, SD = 10.27%) than in the 0-avatar condition (M= 91.27%, SD= 6.49%), and the 1-
avatar condition (91.49% SD= 8.02%), (F(2,18) = 6.17, p = .005, hp2 = 0.250), (See Figure 
5).  
Planned contrast analyses revealed a significant difference between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 0-avatar condition, with performance being significantly worse in the 
former than in the latter (t(19) = 2.83, p = .011, d = 0.485), and also between the 2-avatar 
condition and the 1-avatar condition, with performance being significantly worse in the 
former than in the latter (t(19) = 2.69, p = .015, d = 0.476). These result are consistent with 
the hypothesis of a perspective taking mechanism and not with the hypothesis that a spatial 
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cueing mechanism underlies the effects of avatars on performance in this task. There was no 
significant difference between the 1-avatar and the 0-avatar conditions (t(19) = 0.213, p = .83, 
d= 0.031). 
Table 1a. The two competing hypotheses. 
  
 What underlies 
performance on 
Inconsistent Self 
trials in Samson 
et al., (2010)? 
How should the 
difference in 
performance on 
Consistent Self 
and Inconsistent 
Self trials in 
Samson et al., 
(2010) be 
interpreted? 
Prediction: If 
there were two 
avatars rather 
than one or zero 
on Self 
Inconsistent 
trials with discs 
on both walls, 
would 
performance be 
better or worse?  
Prediction: If 
you remove the 
avatar from Self 
Inconsistent 
trials with discs 
on both walls, 
would 
performance be 
better or worse? 
The Perspective-
Taking 
Hypothesis 
A perspective 
taking 
mechanism 
It is an 
altercentric 
interference 
effect. 
Worse 
 
Better 
 
The Cueing 
Hypothesis 
An attentional 
mechanism 
It is a cueing 
effect. 
Better 
 
Equal or Worse 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Summary of the predictions generated by the two competing hypotheses for 
Experiments 1-3. 
 
Experiment SOA Secondary 
Task 
Prediction: When there are two avatars 
rather than one or zero, will performance 
be better or worse? 
 
    
   Perspective taking 
mechanism  
Attentional 
mechanism  
1 800ms [none] Worse  Better 
2 0 [none] Worse Better 
3 800ms auditory-tone-
monitoring 
task 
Worse [none] 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The results of Experiment 1 revealed a significant effect of the number of avatars, with 
participants performing better on trials with two avatars than on trials with one or zero 
avatars. This is consistent with the operation of a spatial cueing mechanism. In contrast, they 
are difficult to account for by appealing to the operation of a perspective-taking mechanism. 
This confirms that the stimuli and the number verification procedure used in the dot 
perspective task can be used to trigger a spatial cueing mechanism. However, it would be 
hasty to draw any conclusions from this about the mechanisms underpinning the findings 
from the original dot perspective task. This is because Experiment 1 differed from the original 
dot perspective task in that it included an SOA of 800 ms.  
 For this reason, we conducted Experiment 2, in which there was no SOA. Here we 
observed the reverse pattern: participants performed better on trials with one avatar than on 
trials with two avatars. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the dot perspective task taps 
a perspective-taking mechanism distinct from spatial cueing. On the perspective-taking 
hypothesis, the presence of any avatar with an inconsistent perspective should interfere with 
the task rather than facilitate it. Thus, given that all trials involve discs on both walls, 
performance should be worse on trials in which there are two avatars (each with a perspective 
that is inconsistent with the perspective of the participant) than on trials with one avatar (with 
just one perspective that is inconsistent with that of the participant) or on trials with no avatar 
(in which there is no inconsistent perspective).  
 The findings from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, taken together, suggest that there 
may be two separate mechanisms at work, with the perspective-taking mechanism 
predominating at earlier time points and the spatial cueing mechanism predominating at later 
time points. If this is correct, it may be possible to selectively intervene on the spatial cueing 
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mechanism and prolong the effects of the perspective-taking mechanism.  Since the spatial 
cueing mechanism depends upon executive function (Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; 
Frischen et al., 2007), it may therefore be suppressed through the imposition of a demanding 
secondary task. By contrast, there is evidence that the perspective-taking mechanism operates 
automatically (Qureshi, Apperly & Samson; 2010), and would thus be robust under dual-task 
conditions. We therefore conducted Experiment 3 in which there was an SOA of 800 ms, as in 
Experiment 1, but in which participants were also asked to concurrently perform a secondary 
task. We predicted that the secondary task would interfere with the spatial cueing mechanism, 
and that the perspective-taking mechanism would therefore predominate on this version of the 
task, which should result in better performance with 0 or 1 avatar than with 2. The results 
confirm this prediction, with performance being worse with 2 avatars than with 1 or 0 (See 
Tables 1a and 1b for a summary of the different patterns of predictions generated by the 
perspective-taking hypothesis and the spatial cueing hypothesis).  
Taken together, the results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 suggest that a spatial cueing 
mechanism may be engaged in the dot perspective task if an SOA is involved, but that this is 
unlikely to explain the findings from standard versions of the paradigm that do not include an 
SOA. This is consistent with the findings of Marotta, Lupiánez, Martella, & Casagrande 
(2012), who systematically varied not only the locations of targets, but also the objects (i.e. 
rectangular figures) in which those targets appeared, and were thereby able to show that faces, 
unlike arrows, trigger a pure location-based cueing effect, whereas arrows, unlike faces, 
trigger a pure object-based cueing effect. They interpret this finding as evidence that faces 
and arrows engage qualitatively different (i.e. location-based versus object-based) orienting 
mechanisms.  
 In sum, our results strongly suggest that the perspective-taking mechanism engaged in 
the standard dot perspective task is distinct from spatial cueing. This finding vindicates the 
use of the dot perspective paradigm as a tool for investigating the nature and limitations of 
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fast and efficient mindreading processes in neurotypical (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; 
Furlanetto et al., 2016) and autistic (Schwarzkopf et al., 2014) populations, and thus also as a 
means of testing theories of the cognitive architecture of mindreading (Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013; Christensen & Michael, 2015, Westra, 2016). Further research may investigate how, if 
at all, this perspective-taking mechanism may be modulated by and/or integrated with 
attentional mechanisms.  
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